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I. INTRODUCTION 
 For many adults, a central concern in life is the health and wel-
fare of their children. A new baby ushers in decades of dedicated 
work and anxiety to foster the child’s life, to limit the inevitable pain, 
and to provide every advantage parents can reasonably afford. For 
most of human history, this work began at birth1 because, until re-
cently, pregnancy was a black box, largely beyond parental influence 
other than through prayers and wholesome living. This situation has 
changed profoundly over the past twenty-five years. An array of 
technologies now can provide a detailed examination of the embryo 
and fetus, genetically, biochemically, and anatomically. The day is 
not yet here when we can effectively change the embryo or fetus from 
these perspectives, but we can effectively choose to accept or reject 
what we find. The ability to select our children based on detailed bio-
logic characteristics is new. Efforts to provide the child with every 
advantage may begin with choosing the desired child at the very be-
ginning. Questions over whether our society should promote or re-
strict this power also are new. These new capabilities will likely cre-
ate one of the most difficult and divisive social debates over the next 
century. 
 This Article examines the debate from a professional perspective. 
Because those in the medical profession are gatekeepers for prenatal 
diagnostic technology, one approach to these questions is to ask what 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor of Pediatrics, Adjunct Professor of Internal Medicine in the Division of 
Human Genetics, University of Utah. A.B., Princeton University; M.D., University of Pitts-
burgh; Fellowship in Law, Ethics and Health, Johns Hopkins University in affiliation with 
the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University. This Article was supported by a 
grant from the National Genome Research Institute (#HGO 1966-02).  
 1. Pregnant women throughout recorded history have attempted to protect and fos-
ter their children before birth by eating good food and avoiding alcoholic drinks and physi-
cal labor during pregnancy. Until the last century, the medical community thought that 
maternal experiences could affect the developing child in quite specific ways. For example, 
a negative influence might be the sighting of a rabbit that was thought to result in a “hare 
lip.” Alternatively, by exposing pregnant women to beautiful art and music, children 
gained positive influences. This tradition continues today in the recent fad over encourag-
ing women to expose their developing fetuses to classical music. 
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tests and technologies the ethical practitioner should provide.2 The 
answers to this question can be guided by professional, ethical and 
legal standards that are emerging in genetic medicine. This Article 
begins by offering three hypothetical clinical scenarios to frame the 
issues. 
 Case #1: Molly and Bert are pregnant with their third child. 
Molly is 36 years of age, Bert is 39, and both are in good health, as 
are their two other children. The pregnancy proceeds uneventfully 
under the guidance of their obstetrician, Dr. Owen. Dr. Owen is relig-
iously and philosophically opposed to pregnancy termination other 
than for the protection of the life of the mother and, given the smooth 
course of this pregnancy, he does not discuss prenatal diagnosis with 
the couple. Dr. Owen recognizes that this failure to offer prenatal di-
agnosis is contrary to the prevailing standard of care. Women who 
will be 35 years of age or older at the time of delivery are at increased 
risk of bearing a child with Down syndrome and other syndromes 
caused by an increased number of chromosomes.3 Therefore, it has 
been standard practice for at least two decades to offer prenatal di-
agnosis to women of “advanced maternal age” to detect these condi-
tions, if the parents so choose. Molly’s pregnancy proceeds to term, at 
which time she delivers a small infant girl, Alexandra, with the stig-
mata of Down syndrome. Chromosome analysis confirms the pres-
ence of Trisomy 21. Additional evaluation also confirms the presence 
of complex congenital heart disease in the infant. 
 Molly and Bert are shocked and saddened at the realization of 
Alexandra’s diagnosis and of the difficult challenges ahead for them 
and for their child. As they learn that prenatal diagnosis could have 
predicted this outcome, they become increasingly angry. Had they 
been offered prenatal diagnosis,4 they would have accepted. Upon 
                                                                                                                    
 2. A separate approach would be to ask what sorts of prenatal tests and technologies 
should be used by an ethical couple. This question is less well explored than the profes-
sional standards question. Also, the question for prospective parents often becomes mired 
in abortion politics. 
 3. Down syndrome is also termed Trisomy 21. KENNETH LYONS JONES, SMITH’S 
RECOGNIZABLE PATTERNS OF HUMAN MALFORMATION 8-13 (5th ed. 1997). Humans nor-
mally have a total of forty-six chromosomes in each cell, twenty-three from the person’s 
mother and twenty-three from the father. LYNN B. JORDE ET AL., MEDICAL GENETICS 7 
(Emma B. Underdown ed., 1995). The chromosomes are numbered from one through 
twenty-two plus the X and Y chromosomes that determine gender. Id. Therefore each of us 
normally has two #21 chromosomes. In Down syndrome, three #21 chromosomes are pre-
sent, two from one parent and one from the other. JONES, supra, at 8-13. This extra chro-
mosome causes the common characteristics of Down syndrome that include mild to moder-
ate mental retardation, characteristic faces, and heart and/or bowel abnormalities. Id. 
Other less common trisomy syndromes include Trisomy 18 and Trisomy 13, both of which 
cause profound mental retardation and typically an early death. Id. at 14-23. 
 4. The term “prenatal diagnosis” encompasses a range of technologies. Amniocente-
sis is perhaps most familiar; a needle is inserted into the amniotic sac surrounding the fe-
tus at about 16 weeks gestation. Fetal cells are isolated from the fluid and their chromo-
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learning of the affected fetus, they would have regretfully, but surely, 
terminated the pregnancy. Molly and Bert choose to bring a legal 
claim against Dr. Owen for his failure to provide timely information 
about their reproductive risks and options. 
 The question for our analysis is whether the parents should have 
a valid legal or ethical claim. Should Dr. Owen be held legally or 
ethically responsible for the birth of this impaired child? 
 Case #2: Alice and Jack are pregnant with their first child. In 
their initial prenatal visit with Dr. Owen, he took a brief family his-
tory of both sides of the family to identify genetic risks to the develop-
ing child. However, Dr. Owen failed to take an adequate family his-
tory concerning cancer. Jack’s sister developed breast cancer at age 
37, his mother died recently of ovarian cancer at age 59, and his ma-
ternal aunt had breast cancer at age 46. This family pattern is 
suggestive of a heritable mutation in either the BRCA1 or BRCA2 
genes. Women who are mutation carriers for BRCA1 or BRCA2 have 
a lifetime risk of up to eighty-five percent for breast or ovarian 
cancer. While there are no significant health risks to a man who is a 
mutation carrier for either of these genes, he can transmit the mu-
tation to his daughters and sons. Genetic testing for BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 mutations has been available clinically for about seven years. 
 Alice’s pregnancy proceeds uneventfully to term. A vigorous, 
healthy baby girl, Anastasia, is born. Six months later, Jack’s sister 
learns through genetic testing that she has a BRCA1 mutation. Jack 
and, subsequently, Anastasia obtain genetic testing, revealing that 
they both carry the BRCA1 mutation. Alice and Jack are devastated. 
After watching the difficult death of Jack’s mother and the suffering 
of his sister and aunt with breast cancer, they can only look forward 
with dread to the future of their beautiful little girl. Why didn’t Dr. 
Owen take an adequate family history? Had they learned of their risk 
in a timely fashion, they would have done BRCA1 testing on the fetus 
and terminated the pregnancy without hesitation. They bring suit 
against Dr. Owen for his failure to provide timely information about 
their reproductive risks and options. 
 The question for our analysis is whether the parents should have 
a valid legal or ethical claim. Should Dr. Owen be held legally or 
ethically responsible for the birth of this child? 
 Case #3: Susan and Jim Jingle are pregnant with their fifth child. 
At only eight weeks gestation, Susan and Jim are thrilled but not 
ready to announce the pregnancy to the family or the public. They 
                                                                                                                    
somes are analyzed. Chorionic villous sampling (CVS) can be performed earlier in the 
pregnancy. CVS involves insertion of a needle or catheter to sample cells from the fetal 
side of the placenta which contain the same chromosome structure as the fetus itself. Ul-
trasound is available to provide a detailed anatomic examination of the fetus. 
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recognize that this news would be met with some public fanfare be-
cause the Jingle family is a highly popular singing and musical group 
called, appropriately, “The Jingles.” Both Susan and Jim have perfect 
musical pitch, as do all of their four children. This innate talent has 
allowed the children to develop extraordinary musical skills at young 
ages, albeit with intensive training and practice beginning by age 3. 
There is a strong family history of perfect musical pitch on both sides 
of the family, and both families have had noted musicians and enter-
tainers for generations. This kind of family history is unusual, but 
not so rare that it escaped the attention of geneticists.5 Imagine for 
the purposes of this Article that a molecular biologist in England re-
cently identified a gene variant that confers perfect musical pitch in 
the majority of individuals who carry this variant. A prominent 
medical journal published the finding and, subsequently, several 
other investigators have confirmed the association in additional fami-
lies. 
 Susan and Jim are hopeful that this new baby will fit in the fam-
ily mold. Indeed, they are a little fearful of how they would raise a 
child that could not be an integral member of the family activity—
and not to mention the creative and financial possibilities of a cute 
new Jingle in the band. They ask Dr. Owen, Susan’s obstetrician, 
about the possibility of having another child with perfect musical 
pitch. He chuckled, “Oh, who knows? These kinds of things are 
mostly just plain luck, although you folks have been awfully lucky 
with the other kids. So, I guess the chances are pretty good this one 
will be talented, too.” Sadly, though, this one was not talented. Susan 
and Jim learned of the genetic test for the “musical pitch gene” 
through a magazine interview late in Susan’s pregnancy. It was too 
late to do prenatal testing but they had their baby tested while he 
was a newborn. He had not inherited the trait from either parent, 
and so, while he was healthy, he would have no more innate musical 
talent than any random kid off the street. Their disappointment was 
further fueled by the knowledge that Susan could have had prenatal 
diagnosis for this trait well before the public knew she was pregnant. 
Dr. Owen had given them false information and he obviously did not 
have enough professional good sense to look up the correct answer to 
their question. Music is the lifeblood of their family, not some trivial 
trait like blue eyes or big ears. This was too important to leave to 
dumb luck. The Jingles brought suit against Dr. Owen, claiming that 
had he accurately informed Susan and Jim about the availability of a 
genetic test, they would have used it and terminated the pregnancy 
upon detection of the undesirable fetus. 
                                                                                                                    
 5. See, e.g., Joseph Profita & T. George Bidder, Perfect Pitch, 29 AM. J. MED. 
GENETICS 763 (1988) (studying note recognition capacity in thirty-five subjects). 
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 The question for our analysis is whether the parents should have 
a valid legal or ethical claim. Should Dr. Owen be held legally or 
ethically responsible for the birth of this child? 
II.   THE LEGAL CONCEPTS OF WRONGFUL LIFE AND WRONGFUL BIRTH 
 Over the past twenty years, the courts have provided a partial 
answer to the questions posed by these cases. Wrongful life and 
wrongful birth are two related medical malpractice actions that have 
arisen since the 1973 Roe v. Wade6 decision to address claims of neg-
ligence leading to the birth of an impaired child. Health care provid-
ers are the usual defendants in these suits after the birth of a child 
with congenital malformations or a genetic disease. Wrongful birth 
actions refer to suits by the parents who claim harm to themselves 
from the birth of an ill or disabled child.7 Parents in these suits typi-
cally claim that, had they been adequately informed of their repro-
ductive risk, they would have taken measures to prevent the preg-
nancy or birth of the affected child.8 Wrongful life claims are brought 
in similar clinical circumstances; however, these claims arise from 
the child who asserts harm from birth in an impaired condition.9 But 
for the negligence of the health care provider, the child claims she 
would not have been born to suffer with her condition.10 Neither of 
these claims is based on allegations that the defendant caused the 
impairment through negligent actions as, say, through the use of a 
teratogenic drug. Wrongful life and wrongful birth claims are based 
on allegations of inadequate or incorrect information that would have 
permitted the parents to avoid pregnancy or to detect the abnormal-
ity prenatally and terminate the pregnancy.11 
 The wrongful life and wrongful birth suits have become increas-
ingly prevalent over the past three decades for at least two reasons. 
First, Roe v. Wade established constitutional protection for abortion 
decisions through the first two trimesters of pregnancy. Second, 
medicine is offering an expanding array of technologies to evaluate 
the health of the fetus. In light of these developments, health care 
providers are seen to have parallel obligations to offer testing in a va-
riety of clinical circumstances, and to adequately warn couples who 
have an increased risk of bearing a child with a heritable condition or 
congenital malformation. Failure to provide timely, accurate infor-
                                                                                                                    
 6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 7. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 487 (Wash. 1983). 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 494. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Lori B. Andrews, Torts and the Double Helix: Malpractice Liability for Failure to 
Warn of Genetic Risks, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 149, 152-57 (1992). 
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mation according to the standard of care may leave providers liable 
under wrongful life and/or wrongful birth suits. 
 The wrongful life claim has met with limited success. To date, five 
state courts have recognized the wrongful life claim,12 while nineteen 
have rejected this tort.13 The primary difficulty for the wrongful life 
claim has been the implicit claim that a child would prefer non-
existence to existence in an impaired condition. In these circum-
stances, existence without the condition was never a possibility for 
these children. So, the choice on behalf of the child was existence 
with impairments or non-existence through contraception or preg-
nancy termination. The children must assert that, but for the negli-
gence of the defendant, they would not exist. In response to this di-
lemma, most courts have adopted the reasoning first articulated in 
the New York case of Becker v. Schwartz,14 in which the fundamental 
philosophic problem with wrongful life suits was described: 
The first, in a sense the more fundamental [problem with wrongful 
life claims], is that it does not appear that the infants suffered any 
legally cognizable injury. . . . Whether it is better never to have 
been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficien-
cies is a mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and 
the theologians. Surely the law can assert no competence to re-
solve the issue. . . . Not only is there to be found no predicate at 
common law or in statutory enactment for judicial recognition of 
the birth of a defective child as an injury to the child; the implica-
tions of any such proposition are staggering.15 
 The few courts that have recognized the wrongful life claims often 
have been willing largely to overlook the philosophical problems in-
herent in the claim and to support the suits based on the medical 
needs of the child and/or the public policy advantages of deterring 
                                                                                                                    
 12. See, e.g., Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 483; see also Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965-
66 (Cal. 1982); Quinn v. Blau, No. CV 963256915, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3319, at *8 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1997); Rosen v. Katz, No. 93-394A, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
618 at *10-11 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 1996); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760 (N.J. 
1984). 
 13. Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735 (Ariz. 
1990); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del., 
Inc., 581 A.2d 288 (Del. 1989); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987); Kush v. 
Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992); Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 
S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987); 
Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1986); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 
2d 1151 (La. 1988); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990); Proffit v. Bartolo, 412 
N.W.2d 232 (Mich. App. 1987); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Becker v. 
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Flanagan v. Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1993); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 
872 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St. Michael’s Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975); Beardsley v. 
Weirdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982). 
 14. 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978). 
 15. Id. at 812. 
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negligent medical care.16 A California court in 1980 concluded: 
The reality of the “wrongful life” concept is that such a plaintiff 
both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others. It is nei-
ther necessary nor just to retreat into meditation on the mysteries 
of life. We need not be concerned with the fact that had defendants 
not been negligent, the plaintiff might not have come into exis-
tence at all.17 
 While the trend has been against the wrongful life concept, courts 
in both Massachusetts and Connecticut have supported the tort 
within the past few years. A 1997 decision by the Connecticut Supe-
rior Court, quoting a 1983 decision, stated: “There is nothing illogical 
in a plaintiff saying ‘I’d rather not be suffering as I am, but since 
your wrongful conduct preserved my life, I am going to take advan-
tage of my regrettable existence to sue you.’”18 A Massachusetts court 
was faced with a case in which a suit was brought against a physi-
cian who failed to report abnormalities on a fetal ultrasound and to 
repeat the examination.19 The mother gave birth to a child with heart 
and bowel abnormalities, and the parents relinquished the child for 
adoption.20 The court concluded: 
Corey’s parents are not entitled to recover against the defendant 
for the ongoing extraordinary costs that Corey will incur because 
of the defect (due to the fact that they are no longer his legal 
guardians or official parents). Nor will Corey’s adoptive parents be 
entitled to recover, since the defendant owed them no duty. There-
fore, this Court must consider whether Corey should have this 
cause of action since no one else can recover the extraordinary 
costs. . . . In this situation, it appears fair . . . to require the negli-
gent Doctor to pick up these costs if negligence is proven.21 
 Therefore, in order to assure adequate care to a child with dis-
abilities, some courts have been willing to recognize wrongful life 
claims without explicitly declaring that life with disability can be 
worse than non-existence. 
 The New York Court of Appeals in Becker v. Schwartz22 deferred 
to philosophers and theologians on the basic question of whether ex-
                                                                                                                    
 16. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), disap-
proved of by Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982). 
 17. Id. at 488. 
 18. Quinn v. Blau, No. CV96325691S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3319, at *21 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1997) (quoting Alexander Morgan Capron, The Continuing Wrong of 
“Wrongful Life,” in GENETICS AND THE LAW II, at 81, 89 (Aubrey Milunsky & George J. An-
nas eds., 1979)). 
 19. Rosen v. Katz, No. 93-394A, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 618, at *1 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Feb. 14, 1996). 
 20. Id. at *2. 
 21. Id. at *9-10. 
 22. 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978). 
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istence confers a harm for some children. Bioethicists, theologians, 
and physicians have offered a range of opinions on this question. 
John Lorber, a British surgeon, wrote in 1975 of the deliberate non-
treatment of some severely affected children with spina bifida: 
There are ethicists and moralists, as well as doctors, who consider 
that life must be maintained at any cost, because any life is better 
than no life. It may be legitimate to adhere to such principles 
within their own family, but is it not right to enforce such a phi-
losophy on others who do not hold with it. To my knowledge none 
of the world’s great religions or religious leaders believe that a se-
verely defective innocent newborn infant would be worse off in 
heaven or wherever they believe their souls will go after death. Is 
it therefore humane to inflict an immense amount of suffering on 
such infants and on their families to ensure that they reach this 
heaven or haven in the end?23 
 Margery Shaw, a geneticist and attorney, argued that “fetal 
abuse,” through knowingly bringing a child to birth with a genetic 
condition, should be made analogous to child abuse in the law.24 She 
would sanction not only wrongful life suits against negligent physi-
cians, but similar suits against parents. 
[P]arents should be held accountable to their children if they 
knowingly and willfully choose to transmit deleterious genes or if 
the mother waives her right to an abortion if, after prenatal test-
ing, a fetus is discovered to be seriously deformed or mentally de-
fective. They have added to the burdens of the other family mem-
bers, they have incurred a cost to society, and, most importantly, 
they have caused needless suffering in their child.25 
In fact, the wrongful life claim raises this odd question of the parents’ 
responsibility for the birth of an affected child. When prenatal diag-
nosis detects a fetus with a genetic condition or congenital malforma-
tion, some parents choose to continue the pregnancy. Also, parents at 
risk for bearing a child with a genetic condition may choose to forego 
prenatal diagnosis and accept the risk of an affected child. As argued 
by Shaw, might the affected child have a wrongful life claim against 
the parents? The State of California was concerned enough about this 
possibility after the success of a wrongful life claim in the case of 
Curlender v. Bio-Science26 that it passed legislation barring suits by 
children against parents for the harm of their existence.27 
                                                                                                                    
 23. John Lorber, Ethical Problems in the Management of Myelomeningocele and Hy-
drocephalus, 10 J. ROYAL C. PHYSICIANS 47, 58 (1975). 
 24. See Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL 
MED. 63, 111 (1984). 
 25. Id. 
 26. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982). 
2003]                          PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 273 
 
 In contrast to these authors, James Bopp, Barry Bostrom, and 
Donald McKinney argue from a “right to life” perspective that one of 
the very foundations of modern law and civilized society is that life 
has enormous intrinsic value.28 
[W]rongful birth/life claims . . . require a new legal theory, in that 
life itself is considered a wrong, and death is preferred over life 
with disabilities. By deviating from the general principle, histori-
cally found in civilized law, that life, even with disabilities, is 
valuable and that only wrongful death is compensable, wrongful 
birth/life actions are a radical departure from fundamental legal 
philosophy.29 
Similarly, authors writing from a disabilities rights perspective as-
sert that it is simply wrong that those with disabilities lead lives of 
hopeless despair.30 The greatest difficulties for those with impair-
ments, it is claimed, are often not due to the condition per se, but to 
the discriminatory attitudes and barriers in society. Wrongful life 
(and wrongful birth) suits are seen by many of these authors as re-
flective of an inaccurate and inappropriate attitude in society toward 
life with a disability. 
 Finally, some bioethicists claim that the assertion that life with 
impairments is worse than non-existence is only justifiable for a few 
extremely severe conditions.31 From the perspective of the child, even 
the most rudimentary awareness and existence might be sufficient to 
experience a life of value. According to these authors, the kinds of 
conditions for which wrongful life suits have been brought, such as 
Down syndrome or congenital rubella syndrome, would not be justi-
fied from the perspective of the child. 
 The limited success of the wrongful life suits is not likely to 
change in the next decade or two. The primary challenge to these 
claims is the philosophical conundrum they pose. Some courts have 
been willing to overlook this problem in search of support for a dis-
abled plaintiff when adequate support for medical expenses is not 
otherwise available.32 We might expect this pattern to continue in the 
                                                                                                                    
 28. James Bopp et al., The “Rights” and “Wrongs” of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful 
Life: A Jurisprudential Analysis of Birth Related Torts, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 461, 514-15 
(1989). 
 29. Id. at 514. 
 30. See Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCTIVE 
LAWS FOR THE 1990S 69 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989); Deborah Kaplan, Pre-
natal Screening and Diagnosis: The Impact on Persons with Disabilities, in WOMEN AND 
PRENATAL TESTING: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 49 (1994). 
 31. See Jeffrey R. Botkin, The Legal Concept of Wrongful Life, 259 JAMA 1541, 1544-
45 (1988); Bonnie Steinbock & Ron McClamrock, When is Birth Unfair to the Child?, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 15. 
 32. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 964 (Cal. 1982); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 
N.E.2d 8, 13 (Mass. 1990). 
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future, at least until we have a more comprehensive health care fi-
nancing system. But the other reason wrongful life suits are recog-
nized or pursued is the existence of the wrongful birth claims that 
usually speak to the same set of events. 
 The wrongful birth claims have been considerably more successful 
in the courts. To date, twenty-six states,33 the District of Columbia,34 
and five federal courts35 have recognized a cause of action for wrong-
ful birth. One state has enacted legislation recognizing the validity of 
wrongful birth suits.36 In contrast, five state appellate courts have re-
jected the claim37 and six states have enacted legislation barring 
wrongful birth suits.38 Two state laws banning wrongful birth suits 
have been upheld as constitutional.39 Although the national trend is 
clearly toward the recognition of the claim, wrongful birth remains 
controversial. 
 Several courts and scholars argue that the wrongful birth concept 
is an extension of the constitutionally protected right to privacy in 
abortion decisions.40 The claim is that abortion decisions are depend-
                                                                                                                    
 33. See Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022 (Ala. 1993); Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735 
(Ariz. 1990); Andalon v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), questioned 
in Goldstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Lininger v. 
Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del., Inc., 571 A.2d 786 
(Del. 1989); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 
(Idaho 1984); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 471 N.E.2d 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Bader v. Johnson, 
675 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Arche v. United States Dept. of the Army, 798 P.2d 
477 (Kan. 1990); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 519 So. 2d 105 (La. 1987); Reed v. Cam-
pagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145 (Md. 1993); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990); Eis-
brenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), abrogated by Taylor v. Kura-
pati, 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 
1995); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979), 
declined to follow by Cauman v. George Washington Univ., 630 A.2d 1104 (D.C 1993); 
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ent on information about the welfare of the fetus. Therefore, repro-
ductive choice is limited if inadequate prenatal diagnostic informa-
tion is provided. It is argued that the harm in these cases is not the 
birth of the impaired child, but the infringement on free choice in re-
productive decisions. 
 In contrast, other commentators and courts argue that there is no 
basis for wrongful birth suits under the umbrella of privacy as articu-
lated in Roe v. Wade.41 The constitutional right of privacy in repro-
duction and abortion only prevents state interference with abortion 
decisions, it is argued, and imposes no positive duties on health care 
providers to provide information about the fetus.42 Two state courts 
(Minnesota and Pennsylvania) have examined these arguments and 
held that the state laws barring wrongful birth suits are constitu-
tional.43 Therefore, to date, the provision of prenatal diagnostic in-
formation has not been held to be a protected right under the Consti-
tution. 
 Other commentators and courts argue that wrongful birth suits 
fall more appropriately under the patient’s right of informed con-
sent.44 Informed consent relates specifically to the amount and type 
of information that health care providers must provide to patients 
about medical options.45 It is argued that, in the context of the medi-
cal condition of pregnancy, couples should be told the risk of a prob-
lem for the child in order to decide whether to obtain prenatal diag-
nosis. Under the current foundation for wrongful birth, as recognized 
by the majority of the courts, physicians are held to the prevailing 
standard of care for the provision of timely and accurate information 
about the welfare of the child. 
 While there is prevalent support for the wrongful birth claim in 
the judicial system, there remains a debate over the appropriate cal-
culation of damages in courts recognizing the tort. Courts have con-
sidered several options that attempt to balance the benefits and costs 
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of having and raising an impaired child.46 One method of calculation 
is to award the parents a monetary sum equal to the costs of the con-
tinued pregnancy, the delivery, and the medical costs incurred by the 
child’s impairment. These are seen as the additional costs directly in-
curred because of the claimed negligence of the physician. An addi-
tional award might be added to compensate for the emotional pain 
and suffering of bearing and raising a child with a disability. A third 
element that courts have variously considered is an offset to either of 
these damages for the benefits that a child brings to a family. There-
fore, the damages for emotional pain might be reduced by the jury’s 
estimate of the child’s positive value to the family. 
 Clearly, the emotional pain from bearing and raising an impaired 
child and the emotional benefits of raising any child are highly value-
laden. As a result, many courts have been unwilling to allow these 
kinds of calculations (or, in some circumstances, state law does not 
permit these kinds of awards or offsets).47 The majority of the courts 
have awarded damages for the medical costs incurred by the child’s 
unwanted medical condition while the child is a minor.48 
 The broad recognition of the wrongful birth claim reflects and con-
firms the responsibility of physicians to provide timely and accurate 
information about reproductive risks to prospective parents. But this 
is a vague standard. What information must be provided to prospec-
tive parents? Court decisions have not articulated a broad standard 
because the cases deal with individual claims and circumstances. 
The single largest number of wrongful birth cases have been brought 
for failure to provide information about the risk of Down syndrome to 
women of “advanced maternal age.”49 Other conditions that have led 
to wrongful birth suits include congenital rubella syndrome,50 spina 
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bifida,51 Tay-Sachs disease,52 sickle cell anemia,53 cystic fibrosis,54 and 
a number of other rare conditions.55 Many of the conditions for which 
wrongful birth cases have been brought have only one case for that 
condition. Clearly there are only a few general rules emerging from 
this pattern of tort litigation to guide practitioners. 
 The alleged negligence in these cases falls into three categories. 
First, there are relatively well-defined population groups that are at 
increased risk for certain genetic conditions. Examples include sickle 
cell disease in individuals of African origin and Tay-Sachs disease in 
Ashkenazi Jews. The other prime example is women of advanced ma-
ternal age. The professional error here is not identifying couples who 
are at risk for conditions amenable to prenatal diagnosis and provid-
ing them timely information about test availability. A second cate-
gory involves errors in making a correct diagnosis when suggestive 
signs or symptoms are present. Pregnant women who contract a ru-
bella infection (German measles) are at risk for delivering a child 
with congenital malformations. A misdiagnosis of this subtle infec-
tion in the pregnant woman has been the event leading to a wrongful 
birth suit in several cases.56 A third category is comprised of cases in 
which an older child or other family member was misdiagnosed or 
misinformed about a genetic condition. The Shroeder v. Perkel57 case 
was brought after a physician failed to make a timely diagnosis of 
cystic fibrosis in a boy before the birth of a second affected child. Oc-
casionally, suits will arise from simple laboratory error as well, that 
is, prenatal diagnosis was provided but the information returned to 
the couple was wrong.  
 Within each of these categories, there is a range of information 
that might be provided to prospective parents. For the purposes of 
this discussion, we will focus primarily on the question of risk notifi-
cation. What kinds of conditions should prompt an alert from the 
physician? I have framed the discussion thus far primarily in the 
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context of tort litigation. A description of the case law permits sev-
eral basic conclusions. First, there is a clear tradition supporting a 
minimum standard of risk communication, at least in many jurisdic-
tions.58 There is a reasonably broad social consensus that, for exam-
ple, an older pregnant woman should be informed of the increased 
risk of Down syndrome and other aneuploid syndromes. Or, we can 
conclude that Ashkenazi couples should be warned of their risk of 
bearing a child with Tay-Sachs disease. But the second conclusion is 
that we cannot rely on tort litigation alone to provide sufficient guid-
ance to health care providers. This is true in part because case law is 
primarily reactive. Further, and perhaps most importantly, the law 
speaks to the minimum standard of professional behavior. What the 
professional must do to avoid successful litigation is a different stan-
dard than what we would expect professionals to do to promote in-
formed decision-making for couples during pregnancy. The primary 
standard should be based on our analysis of personal, professional, 
and social ethics, which may be a different standard than that dic-
tated by law. However, the law asks the correct questions in address-
ing the ethical issues involved in defining a professional standard. 
 The remainder of this Article examines the concept of risk from 
two perspectives. The first relates to the probability of the occurrence 
of an adverse event. The second relates to the severity of that ad-
verse outcome. We might decide that it is important to warn prospec-
tive parents about a serious potential outcome even when the prob-
ability is remote. In contrast, a common but relatively trivial out-
come may not be deemed worthy of mention. 
 The knowledge at the base of each of these categories will enlarge 
with the expansion of genetic knowledge and prenatal diagnostic 
technology. Before returning to the arguments about limits on pro-
fessional responsibilities to provide information in this context, this 
Article will briefly review current developments in prenatal diagno-
sis. 
III.   THE TECHNOLOGY OF PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 
 Prenatal diagnosis requires the ability to image the fetus or to 
have access to embryonic or fetal tissue for analysis. The most famil-
iar techniques are ultrasound, amniocentesis, and chorionic villous 
sampling. Ultrasound involves the transmission of sound waves into 
the body through an external probe and the measurement of the re-
turning waves as they bounce off tissues in the body. The images 
created produce a depiction of the external anatomy of the developing 
fetus as well as internal structures like the brain, heart and kidneys. 
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Ultrasound is thought to be entirely safe. The primary limitation of 
the technology is that the fetus must be large enough and sufficiently 
developed to analyze the structure of the major organs. The remark-
able advancement in recent years has been the advent of three-
dimensional ultrasound. This technology combines two-dimensional 
images through digital addition to create stunning three-dimensional 
images of the fetus. These images look much like true photographs. 
From a medical perspective, these images provide detailed informa-
tion about external and internal anatomy and can detect abnormali-
ties of the brain, spine, limbs, bowel, heart, and kidneys. As this 
technology continues to improve, prospective parents can expect to 
have detailed color images of their child from mid-pregnancy onward. 
 Amniocentesis involves the insertion of a needle through the 
mother’s abdomen or through the vagina into the amniotic fluid sack 
surrounding the fetus. Several cc’s of fluid are removed for analysis. 
This fluid contains cells that have been sloughed by the developing 
fetus. These cells, in turn, contain all the genetic material of the fe-
tus. Therefore, a genetic analysis of the fetus can be performed with-
out removing tissues directly from its body. Amniocentesis generally 
is performed at about fifteen to eighteen weeks gestation. The pri-
mary reason to perform amniocentesis is for chromosome analysis. 
However, other genetic tests can be performed on the cells. As the 
number of genetic tests available expands, the number of conditions 
for which the fetus can be tested through amniocentesis will expand 
in parallel. The procedure carries a small risk of inducing labor and 
the subsequent loss of the pregnancy. The usual figure quoted is one 
pregnancy loss for every two hundred procedures.59 While this risk 
may seem relatively low, it should be remembered that amniocente-
sis as a screening tool is conducted on a large number of women who 
will not have affected fetuses. Therefore, an expected “cost” to screen-
ing programs is the occasional loss of a normal fetus in the effort to 
detect fetuses with specific abnormalities. Of course, it also must be 
remembered that amniocentesis only detects conditions for which 
professionals are specifically looking. That is, a normal amniocente-
sis does not warrant the general conclusion that the fetus is healthy. 
 Chorionic villous sampling (“CVS”) involves sampling of tissue 
where the placenta interdigitates with the wall of the uterus. Since 
the placenta is a product of conception, it has the same genetic mate-
rial as the fetus. CVS is conducted by inserting a needle through the 
abdomen or a catheter through the cervix under ultrasound guidance 
to suction the tissue. The primary advantage of CVS is that it can be 
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conducted at nine to twelve weeks gestation, although it can be per-
formed as early as six weeks and as late as fifteen weeks. Recall that 
amniocentesis is usually conducted at fifteen to eighteen weeks. 
Therefore CVS permits an earlier diagnosis if an abnormality is de-
tected. It is generally thought that an earlier termination is associ-
ated with less physical and psychological trauma for the woman. The 
risk of pregnancy loss for CVS is thought to be slightly higher than 
for amniocentesis—approximately one percent.60 
 Fetal cell isolation is a fascinating new approach to prenatal diag-
nosis that has yet to emerge into clinical practice. Research has 
shown that a tiny number of blood cells from the fetus leak through 
the placenta and into the mother’s circulation during the early weeks 
of pregnancy.61 These cells can be distinguished from the mother’s 
cells and successfully separated in the laboratory. This means that 
by eight weeks gestation, a simple blood test from the mother can 
provide a sufficient number of fetal cells to do a genetic analysis. Not 
only does this procedure eliminate the risks associated with amnio-
centesis and CVS, it also provides an even earlier diagnosis. To date, 
it has been easier to detect the cells of male fetuses in the maternal 
circulation due to the presence of the Y chromosome in males. The 
accuracy of fetal cell isolation has not yet been considered great 
enough to use this approach outside the research context. 
 As these brief descriptions illustrate, a goal of prenatal diagnostic 
technology has been to move the point of diagnosis earlier and earlier 
in pregnancy. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”) takes this 
effort to the logical extreme by enabling genetic testing in the embryo 
before it is even implanted in the uterus. This approach requires fer-
tilization of the egg in the laboratory, that is, in vitro fertilization 
(“IVF”). The fertilized egg is permitted to grow to an eight to twelve 
cell mass at which point a cell is removed for analysis. This cell re-
moval does not injure the embryo. The single cell can then be ana-
lyzed to determine if there are any genetic abnormalities. Typically 
during IVF, approximately ten to twelve embryos are created. Using 
PGD on several of the embryos permits a determination of which 
embryos are “affected” and which are not. One or more embryos 
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without the genetic condition would be transferred to the uterus in 
hopes of initiating a pregnancy. 
 Initially PGD was done primarily for couples at high risk for bear-
ing a child with a genetic condition. Some couples chose PGD in order 
to avoid the choice of pregnancy termination. Of course, PGD gener-
ally involves the discarding of embryos but many couples still feel 
that PGD is less ethically troubling than other forms of prenatal di-
agnosis. In more recent years, PGD has become common in couples 
undergoing IVF for fertility reasons as a way of checking the genetic 
health of the embryos prior to transfer to the uterus. Although PGD 
often costs tens of thousands of dollars, more than 700 children have 
been born world-wide following this procedure. To date, there do not 
appear to be risks to the children who are produced from PGD. 
 PGD offers particularly interesting possibilities in the future for 
the genetic selection of children because it may reduce the ethical 
burdens of such selections. Pregnancy termination is a profoundly 
important decision in a woman’s life so it is unlikely that many 
women would choose to terminate a pregnancy for what might be 
considered trivial reasons. Of course cultural norms and pressures 
have a strong influence. For example, prenatal ultrasound for fetal 
gender identification followed by pregnancy termination for female 
fetuses has become relatively common in India and China. Data from 
a 2000 census in China indicates that the male to female ratio for 
newborn infants is as high as 135 males per 100 females in some of 
the more prosperous provinces, due primarily to the availability of 
prenatal ultrasound.62 Requests for prenatal diagnosis for gender se-
lection in the United States are uncommon but not entirely unfamil-
iar. Anecdotally, these requests are often from individuals with a cul-
tural background that favors male children. Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely that cultural norms in the United States will change so sig-
nificantly in the foreseeable future that pregnancy termination for 
mild or trivial conditions will become commonplace, even with the 
advent of chemical abortions that may reduce the physical burdens 
and increase the privacy of termination decisions.63 
 PGD offers an interesting alternative to pregnancy termination 
with several significant advantages. The obvious advantage is the 
avoidance of pregnancy termination. Again, embryos are often dis-
carded or frozen indefinitely in the process, but many couples find 
this less ethically troubling than abortion. The other key advantage 
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is the ability to select from a number of embryos. Following hormone 
stimulation of the woman, approximately ten to twelve oocytes (eggs) 
can be retrieved through a laparoscopic procedure. Following fertili-
zation and removal of the embryos that fail to develop properly, a 
couple may have their choice of half a dozen embryos. In this context, 
gender selection can be performed as well as selection based on any 
other genetic criteria for which testing is available. While a couple 
might be primarily interested in avoiding use of an embryo with seri-
ous deleterious mutation, the technology offers the opportunity for 
much more fine-grained selections. 
 While this technology is available now, two other technical ad-
vances will increase the power of PGD. The first is the potential abil-
ity to harvest eggs in large numbers from tissue samples of the 
ovary. Currently a woman’s ovaries must be stimulated with hor-
mones to produce mature eggs capable of fertilization. In the foresee-
able future, it will be possible to mature eggs in the laboratory. The 
prospect is for the ability to take a slice of ovary through laparoscopic 
surgery and to mature dozens or hundreds of eggs through hormone 
stimulation in a dish. Following fertilization with her partner’s 
sperm and subsequent PGD, the couple would have a wide selection 
of potential children from which to choose. Why not a baby girl for 
the first pregnancy with one set of traits, and a boy for the next 
pregnancy with a different, desirable set of biologic characteristics? 
 The second set of emerging technologies, and the potential weak-
ness in this hypothetical scheme, is the genetic tests themselves. The 
sequencing of the human genome is virtually complete. This se-
quence, along with the genome sequences of a number of experimen-
tal organisms, will permit rapid progress in the identification of 
genes associated with diseases, physical traits, physiologic character-
istics and, potentially, mental characteristics. Along with the se-
quence information comes the ability to conduct tens of thousands of 
genetic tests simultaneously. Therefore, to the extent that we under-
stand how gene sequences function separately and together in the 
body, we can potentially gain enormous volumes of genetic informa-
tion from small tissue samples and possibly even single cells. 
 The challenge in predicting this kind of capability is the current 
uncertainty over the relative contributions of genes, environment, 
and random variation in the development of complex characteristics. 
It is well recognized that for many “simple” genetic conditions involv-
ing only one gene locus, the disease severity in siblings can be quite 
different even though siblings share much of the same genetic back-
ground and similar environments. It is clear that the expression of 
single genes is profoundly influenced by other genes (perhaps many 
other genes), environmental influences, and random variations as or-
ganisms develop and age. On the other hand, we know that genes 
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play a significant role in complex traits such as intelligence. Children 
having bright parents are not guaranteed to be bright themselves, 
but they have a significant statistical advantage compared to chil-
dren of parents with average or less than average intelligence. So, it 
is important to dismiss simple notions of “genetic determinism,” that 
is, the belief that genes are the essential determinants of biologic 
characteristics. Yet, to my mind, it is a mistake to dismiss genes as a 
significant component of complex traits.  
 The important question for this discussion is whether a detailed 
knowledge of an embryo’s genetic makeup will permit any accurate 
predictions of the future traits of that individual as a child or an 
adult. Are there simply too many intervening influences between im-
plantation and, say, grade school to make predictions meaningful? 
My own guess is that such predictions will be much like predicting 
the weather. The weather, too, is the result of an enormous number 
of factors that interact in complex ways. So it may be impossible to 
predict the weather in a given location at a given time with great ac-
curacy, but with more data and more knowledge about interactions, 
some reasonably accurate predictions are increasingly possible. In 
two or three decades, the embryologist could say to a couple,  
“With a healthy pregnancy, no significant injuries or illnesses as 
an infant, and a stimulating early environment, embryo #56 has 
an eighty percent chance of achieving an IQ above 120, and a 
thirty percent chance of an IQ above 140. He also is likely to have 
limited athletic ability and a seventy percent chance of moderate 
obesity by adolescence. Embryo #31 on the other hand . . . .” 
IV.   ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE BIOLOGIC SELECTION OF CHILDREN 
 We can now return to the central question of this discussion. 
What should be the professional’s responsibility to provide prenatal 
diagnostic information? In addressing this set of issues, we should 
assume that professionals are functioning within a broad social con-
text that determines professional norms. That is, these questions are 
too important to leave to physicians alone. Physicians act as the 
gatekeepers but we can hope they will fulfill this role with the gen-
eral guidance and approval of society. 
 The history of wrongful birth litigation offers some general pa-
rameters. We can say with assurance that prenatal diagnosis is here 
to stay and that there are definitive obligations in many jurisdictions 
to offer services to certain at-risk groups. There are also a few well-
articulated professional standards that have their roots, to some de-
gree, in the fear of litigation. As noted, it is well-accepted that obste-
tricians should alert women of “advanced maternal age” to their in-
creased risk for bearing a child with Down syndrome or other ane-
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uploid syndromes and make them aware of prenatal diagnostic capa-
bilities.64 Similarly, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecol-
ogy’s Department of Professional Liability issued a statement in 1985 
indicating that obstetricians should immediately begin to advise 
women about the availability of the alpha-fetoprotein test (“AFP”). 
This tests the pregnant woman’s blood to provide predictive informa-
tion about whether the fetus might be affected with a neural tube de-
fect such as spina bifida.65 The statement advised: “It is equally im-
perative that every prenatal patient be advised of the availability of 
this test and that your discussion about the test and the patient’s de-
cision with respect to the test be documented in the patient’s chart.”66 
 On the other hand, based on legal liability considerations, we 
cannot claim that all potential prenatal diagnostic information must 
be provided to couples. As noted, a challenge to the constitutionality 
of a state law prohibiting wrongful life and wrongful birth torts has 
not been supported in two cases.67 This means that prenatal diagno-
sis is not tightly linked to the notions of privacy or liberty in the 
abortion context. Women have a constitutionally protected right to 
make a decision about pregnancy termination in the first two trimes-
ters of pregnancy. At least according to the two courts which have 
decided this issue, there is not a parallel constitutional right to ob-
                                                                                                                    
 64. Physicians need not provide these services themselves. Professionals can fulfill 
their obligations through the provision of information alone. It may then be up to the 
woman to find someone who provides the service, or who would provide the service at a 
price or location that the woman can manage. 
 65. Spina bifida is one form of “neural tube defect” that is characterized by an abnor-
mality in the development of the coverings of the spine. JONES, supra note 3, 608-09. Chil-
dren born with spina bifida (also termed myelomeningocele) typically have a protruding 
sack or open tissue at some location along the length of the spine. Id. The skin and bony 
protection of the spine are missing due to the failure of the neural tube to close early in fe-
tal development. The spinal cord is exposed, leading to abnormal development and mal-
function. Id. These children usually lack motor and sensory function in the areas of the 
body served by that portion of the spinal cord and below.  
 Another form of neural tube defect is anencephaly, in which the scalp, upper skull, 
and cerebral hemispheres of the brain are missing. Id. Children with anencephaly are ei-
ther stillborn or die within days of delivery unless artificially supported. Id. Neural tube 
defects during fetal development lead to leakage of a chemical called alpha-fetoprotein into 
the amniotic fluid and subsequently into the pregnant woman’s blood stream in small con-
centrations. Aubrey Milunsky, Maternal Serum Screening for Neural Tube and Other De-
fects, in GENETIC DISORDERS AND THE FETUS, supra note 59, at 635-701. An increase in the 
pregnant woman’s blood alpha-fetoprotein level can indicate that the fetus is affected with 
a neural tube defect, although there are a number of other normal and abnormal causes of 
such an elevation. Id. Currently, a battery of three or four chemical tests is performed on 
maternal serum to evaluate the pregnancy for risk of neural tube defects and several other 
conditions, including Down syndrome. Id. 
 66. George J. Annas, Is a Genetic Screening Test Ready When the Lawyers Say It Is?, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1985, at 16, 17 (quoting the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologist’s Department of Professional Liability’s “Alert” issued in May 
1985). 
 67. See Etkind v. Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210, 215 (Ga. 1999); Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson 
Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816, 818 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
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tain any and all information on which a termination decision might 
be based. More specifically, women have a right to decide whether 
they wish to remain pregnant at all; they might not have the right to 
decide whether they wish to remain pregnant with a specific fetus. 
 From an ethical perspective, there also is no discernable right to 
be offered or to obtain a full genetic analysis of the fetus. Privacy 
rights are typically framed as negative rights, that is, one has the 
right to be left alone or to prevent access to personal information.68 
Privacy rights cannot be used to compel the assistance of others or 
compel the provision of information, even if the subsequent use of the 
information is a private matter.69 More plausibly, the ethical founda-
tion of prenatal diagnostic information is the right to make an in-
formed decision about important health issues like reproduction. If 
so, then prenatal diagnostic choices are akin to many other choices in 
medical relationships. Typically in other areas of medicine, providers 
are required to provide some information but not all conceivable in-
formation about available choices. 
 Some authors contend that the ethical standard for the provision 
of prenatal diagnostic information should be all-inclusive. That is, all 
information that each individual woman or couple requires to make a 
decision should be provided.70 Adrienne Asch argues that such a 
standard permits full choice and avoids the divisive and destructive 
task of “line-drawing” whereby some conditions are deemed suffi-
ciently severe to warrant prenatal diagnosis while others are not.71 
She would prefer to limit the adverse consequences of prenatal diag-
nosis per se on those with disabilities by improving education about 
life with disabilities and otherwise fighting inaccurate and discrimi-
natory attitudes.72 She trusts that, with time, couples will choose not 
to use or abuse prenatal diagnosis without the need to place artificial 
limits through professional standards.73 
 There are at least several difficulties in promoting what I will call 
a “comprehensive standard.” The first is the simple pragmatic con-
cern over how such extensive and complex information could be 
managed in a professional encounter. Presumably this standard re-
quires that all conditions be discussed for which tests are available, 
without respect to the prevalence of the condition or the relative risk 
of the pregnancy. Even if a variety of different conditions are col-
                                                                                                                    
 68. Kimberly A. Johns, Reproductive Rights of Women: Construction and Reality in 
International and United States Law, 5 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 24 (1998). 
 69. See Tracie B. Loring, Comment, An Analysis of the Informational Privacy Protec-
tion Afforded by the European Union and the United States, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421, 431 
(2002). 
 70. See Asch, supra note 30, at 90-91. 
 71. Id. at 87-88. 
 72. Id. at 88. 
 73. See id. at 87-92. 
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lapsed into logical categories, such as all the conditions that cause 
profound intellectual disabilities, the task would remain formidable. 
Obviously visits to the obstetrician (or family practitioner or nurse-
midwife) need to address a host of issues concerning the pregnancy 
other than prenatal diagnosis so the time is limited to discuss these 
issues. Further, care providers do not consistently address these is-
sues at all at the present time. One observational study of obstetri-
cians and nurse-midwives in 1998 found that sixty percent of first 
prenatal visits addressed family history, sixty percent subsequently 
addressed maternal serum markers (“AFP”), and thirty-four percent 
discussed ultrasound in the second trimester.74 For women of 35 
years and older, ninety-eight percent were counseled about amnio-
centesis or CVS. Notably, the discussion of prenatal diagnosis for 
women less than 35 years took an average of 2.5 minutes while for 
women 35 and older, the discussion lasted an average of 6.9 min-
utes.75 Of course, we also need to consider the time it would take to 
explain all of the results of testing. If thousands of tests are being 
conducted, dozens or even hundreds of results may be sufficiently 
abnormal to warrant discussion.76 
 So from a practical standpoint, it is hard to imagine how expecta-
tions for a vastly expanded discussion about prenatal diagnosis could 
be accommodated.77 Significantly lengthening the visits would re-
quire additional professional personnel, mechanisms to pay for the 
expanded services, and marked improvements in provider education 
to permit accurate patient counseling. These changes would necessi-
tate a fundamental restructuring of prenatal services. If prenatal di-
                                                                                                                    
 74.  Barbara A. Bernhardt et al., Prenatal Genetic Testing: Content of Discussions Be-
tween Obstetric Providers and Pregnant Women, 91 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 648, 648 
(1998). 
 75. Id.  
 76. The concepts of test sensitivity and specificity are important here but beyond the 
scope of this discussion. Suffice it to say that screening tests are designed to be highly sen-
sitive but not necessarily specific. When a large population is screened, there is almost al-
ways a significant number of false positive test results for each true positive. In the case of 
maternal serum AFP screening for neural tube defects, for every one hundred women with 
an initially positive test result, only two will have an infant affected with a neural tube de-
fect. See Aubrey Milunsky et al., Predictive Values, Relative Risks, and Overall Benefits of 
High and Low Maternal α-Fetoprotein Screening in Singleton Pregnancies: New Epidemi-
ologic Data, 161 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 291, 293 (1989).  
 77. An alternative approach to a comprehensive standard would be to simply perform 
all of the prenatal diagnostic tests for couples that choose prenatal diagnosis without offer-
ing education and separate choice about the different kinds of tests on the complete panel. 
This would save time on the front end of the testing sequence but would not eliminate the 
need to discuss the results of the tests at the other end. Such an approach would not up-
hold the ideal of informed consent and would pose some difficult dilemmas for couples who 
received more information than they really wanted. Of course there would be pressure 
from the professional community to limit the number of tests on the panel to a select num-
ber of relatively severe and relatively common conditions, but that temptation would have 
to be resisted if we wanted a truly comprehensive standard. 
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agnosis becomes an increasingly important medical service, these 
kinds of changes certainly are feasible. We might envision a whole 
new set of professional services to specifically address these needs, 
involving new professionals, new payment mechanisms, and new 
educational technologies. Until such time, a comprehensive standard 
could not be layered onto the current system of prenatal care. 
 A second concern with a comprehensive standard for information 
is that it does not permit an obvious distinction between what infor-
mation is ethically desirable (presumably all) and what information 
might be mandatory. By mandatory here I mean that professionals 
could be held legally liable for damages if the information was not 
provided. Does a comprehensive standard mean that professionals 
could be successfully sued for any relevant information that they 
failed to provide to a couple upon the birth of an affected child? There 
are many rare conditions, mild conditions, and non-disease related 
conditions that are or will be amenable to prenatal diagnosis. It is 
one thing to claim that all these capabilities should be discussed with 
prospective parents, and quite another to assert that failure to do so 
should result in legally enforceable damages. Unless we are willing 
to say that a comprehensive standard is both ethically and legally 
mandatory, then a line-drawing exercise will be necessary to distin-
guish between omissions that merit sanction and those that do not. 
 A third concern with the comprehensive standard relates to the 
goals that such a standard seeks to gain. The concern is that line-
drawing between different heritable or congenital conditions is hurt-
ful to the community of those with disabilities. This sounds plausible, 
although we should not assume that those with disabilities, and 
those who have given birth to children with disabilities, are all in 
agreement with this point. In any case, the question is whether the 
promotion of a comprehensive standard ultimately will be less injuri-
ous to those with disabilities. Surely a social standard to encourage 
extensive discussion of these capabilities will promote actual use of 
the technology. A parallel effort can be made to reduce or eliminate 
discriminatory attitudes toward those with disabilities, but it seems 
highly likely nonetheless that prenatal diagnosis for an expanding 
list of conditions would become increasingly utilized. If so, then it 
also seems possible that disability will be seen less as an acceptable 
form of human diversity and more as an avoidable burden that peo-
ple should choose to prevent. The basic point here is that a compre-
hensive standard for prenatal diagnostic information seems like a 
very poor strategy for promoting tolerance for disability. 
 These considerations leave our quest for professional standards 
for prenatal diagnosis on a broad middle ground. Some information is 
required in certain circumstances but all potential information need 
not nor cannot be provided. In my view, this requires some line-
288  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:265 
 
drawing. That is, we, as a society, must make a determination of 
what kinds of information and tests should be offered for prenatal 
diagnosis and which need not be offered. If we accept this general 
premise, we must decide on a principle or set of principles by which 
such a line could be drawn. In my view, such a line should be drawn 
as a matter of professional standard, not as a matter of law or regu-
lation. Further, as I will outline below, I believe the correct ethical 
analysis is provided by the wrongful birth torts. More specifically, 
the key question is whether the condition often results in tangible 
harms to the parents. 
 The concept of a general “line” in this context is consistent with 
recommendations of the majority of public bodies that have com-
mented on this issue. Of course, there will be many arguments about 
where a line should be placed on a spectrum of disease severity and 
disease prevalence, but the basic concept of a line is familiar. A num-
ber of scholars and authoritative committees have raised concerns 
over the use of prenatal diagnosis for “mild” conditions or “trivial” 
indications. The President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research fo-
cused primarily on prenatal diagnosis for sex selection, stating: 
The idea that it is morally permissible to terminate pregnancy 
simply on the ground that a fetus of that sex is unwanted may also 
rest on the very dubious notion that virtually any characteristic of 
an expected child is an appropriate object of appraisal and selec-
tion. Taken to an extreme, this attitude treats a child as an arti-
fact and the reproductive process as a chance to design and pro-
duce human beings according to parental standards of excellence, 
which over time are transformed into collective standards. . . . 
[T]he Commission concludes that although individual physicians 
are free to follow the dictates of conscience, public policy should 
discourage the use of amniocentesis for sex selection.78 
The Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks of the Institute of Medi-
cine took a more concrete stand and recommended that:  
prenatal diagnosis not be used for minor conditions or characteris-
tics. In particular, the committee felt strongly that the use of fetal 
diagnosis for determination of fetal sex or use of abortion for the 
purpose of preferential selection of the sex of the fetus is a misuse 
of genetic services that is inappropriate and should be discouraged 
by health professionals. . . . The committee believes this issue war-
rants careful scrutiny over the next three to five years as the 
availability of genetic testing becomes more widespread, and espe-
                                                                                                                    
 78. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMED. 
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS 57-58 
(1983). 
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cially as simpler, safer technologies for prenatal diagnosis are de-
veloped.79  
The American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs supports limitation of prenatal diagnostic services to more se-
rious conditions. The council suggests: “Selection to avoid genetic 
disorders would not always be appropriate. . . . [S]election becomes 
more problematic as the effects of the disease become milder and as 
they become manifest later in life.”80 The Council states that a vari-
ety of factors influence whether prenatal selection for specific condi-
tions would be ethically acceptable. The Council encouraged addi-
tional work on the appropriate uses of prenatal diagnosis stating: 
“[I]t is important to begin discussion of the issue now to ensure that 
appropriate ethical guidelines are in place when new applications be-
come available.”81  
 Several scholars have taken similar positions. Thomas Murray 
concludes, “[i]n short, we should not offer to provide prenatally in-
formation about traits or afflictions that are not substantial burdens 
on parent and child. We certainly should not assist couples in a mis-
guided quest for the child that embodies their ideal collection of 
traits, including gender.”82 Several authors have attempted to draw 
more lines to preclude specific uses of prenatal diagnosis. Stephen 
Post, Peter Whitehouse and Jeffrey Botkin argued against the use of 
prenatal diagnosis for familial Alzheimer disease.83 Carson Strong 
argued for no restrictions on prenatal diagnosis for disease related 
conditions.84 Strong’s analysis would support a clinician who refused 
services for diagnosing nondisease related characteristics.85 Dena 
Davis has written about the circumstance in which deaf parents con-
sider using prenatal diagnosis to assure that their child also will be 
deaf.86 Davis concludes: 
A decision, made before a child is even born, that confines her for-
ever to a narrow group of people and a limited choice of careers, so 
violates the child’s right to an open future that no genetic counsel-
ing team should acquiesce in it. The very value of autonomy that 
                                                                                                                    
 79. COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, DIV. OF HEALTH SCIENCES POL’Y, INST. OF 
MED., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 105 (Lori 
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grounds the ethics of genetic counseling should preclude assisting 
parents in a project that so dramatically narrows the autonomy of 
the child to be.87 
 What are the competing considerations for developing a “line”? As 
we have seen, there is an expanding array of technical developments 
that permit an analysis of the embryo and fetus, potentially with less 
physical risk to the prospective mother. Since these tools are avail-
able and many couples wish to avoid the birth of a child with dis-
abilities, there is an impetus to ensure that couples are aware of 
these options. To the extent that a child with a significant disability 
can have an adverse effect on the parents in terms of heartache, 
worry, time, effort, and money, the avoidance of these impacts pro-
motes the welfare of the parents. We can say that failure to provide 
information about prenatal risks for a child with a significant disabil-
ity is contrary to the interests of the parents. This concept is consis-
tent with the basic rationale of the wrongful birth suits. However, 
this rationale weakens as the adverse impact on the parents weak-
ens. The rationale virtually disappears for conditions that do not 
have a significantly adverse effect on the parents.88 This includes, ar-
guably, non-health conditions, mild or treatable conditions, and con-
ditions that do not affect children.  
 Some in the disability rights advocacy community argue that chil-
dren with disabilities do not have adverse effects on parents and 
families.89 In my view, the advocates are correct that often, very of-
ten, the adverse effects are overstated. The literature does not sup-
port the notion that children with significant disabilities are a com-
mon trigger for divorce, or a source of chronic sorrow, or dysfunction 
in families. Such impacts occasionally occur, most often in couples 
with marginal coping skills to begin with, but they are not the norm. 
The literature tends to suggest that most families cope quite well 
with the demands of a disabled child and that the child is loved and 
supported as his or her own person and for what he or she brings to 
the family. I believe many or most of these parents would not con-
sider the disabled child to have caused a negative impact on the fam-
ily. So these issues are by no means straightforward. Yet, I think we 
can also say that successful coping with a significant disability re-
quires an enormous investment of time, energy, money and lost op-
portunities. Even though a good outcome is often achieved, the path 
is difficult. Further, many parents who have had a child with, say, 
Tay Sachs disease or cystic fibrosis use prenatal diagnosis to prevent 
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 88. See generally Jeffrey R. Botkin, Fetal Privacy and Confidentiality, HASTINGS 
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 89. See Asch, supra note 30, at 85. 
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the birth of a second affected child. So we certainly cannot conclude 
that all parents of disabled children view the experience as reward-
ing on the whole. The basic point here is that although families typi-
cally cope very well with the challenges of a disabled child, the ex-
perience is sufficiently demanding that many reasonable, sensitive 
people would choose to forgo that challenge. Further, the magnitude 
of that challenge can be used as a criterion for whether prenatal di-
agnostic information should be offered. 
 We might also question whether disabilities have adverse effects 
on the children themselves to the extent that prenatal diagnosis and 
pregnancy termination would be a preferred alternative for the child. 
In my view, criticisms of the wrongful life concept are valid, and it 
cannot be argued that prenatal diagnosis and pregnancy termination 
are justified on behalf of the child. While there may be rare excep-
tions to this general conclusion, it is valid for the great majority of 
conditions for which prenatal diagnosis is available. 
 Also in support of a duty to offer prenatal diagnostic information 
is the respect we hold for a certain protected sphere of decision-
making around our reproductive lives. John Robertson argues that 
couples should be free to do what they want with their reproductive 
lives unless someone else is injured or risks injury on the process.90 
This makes sense, although agreement will break down on how we 
define injury and risk of injury in this context. Obviously, a big part 
of the abortion debate is whether “someone” of moral significance is 
being terminated. In any case, the basic point here is that we, as a 
society, may want to show somewhat more deference to reproductive 
decisions compared to other kinds of medical decisions. 
 In contrast, there are a number of important considerations that 
work to limit the provision of information. The basic fact that em-
bryos are discarded through PGD and fetuses are terminated 
through other forms of prenatal diagnosis raises serious ethical con-
cerns. For those who believe that prenatal life should be afforded full 
moral status, this whole enterprise is ethically unacceptable. For 
many others, embryos and fetuses do not have full moral status as 
persons but they have sufficient moral status to preclude destruction 
for trivial reasons. Society is likely to remain divided on the moral 
status question, but I believe there is sufficient consensus that public 
policy about prenatal diagnosis should not promote or condone dis-
carding embryos or terminating fetuses for less than weighty rea-
sons. 
 A more subtle set of considerations relate to the nature of the par-
ent-child relationship. Parents have broad control over their chil-
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dren’s environment, including discipline, diet, religion and education. 
Fine-grained prenatal selections could extend this control to the bio-
logic nature of children. To some extent, parents can alter the biology 
of children through surgery or medications, but these interventions 
are tightly regulated through the medical profession. Any such inter-
ventions would only be justified based on the welfare of the child. A 
surgeon would not perform plastic surgery on a child at the behest of 
a parent’s request unless the surgeon was convinced it was in the 
best interest of the child first and foremost. The immediate point is 
that society does exert some control over the parent-child relation-
ship to limit the control parents have over many aspects of their chil-
dren’s lives. 
 More to the point, however, is the question of whether the selec-
tion of children for desirable characteristics will improve the quality 
of children’s lives or of the parent-child relationship. Parents do try 
to influence and control the lives of their children to a significant ex-
tent, but, ultimately, children mature and move toward their own in-
dependent goals in life. This is always a complex and often difficult 
transition. Many people experience this transition first as a child and 
second as a parent. These are both central relationships in life. What 
will prenatal diagnosis and selection add to this relationship? To the 
extent that strong parent-child relationships are founded on a core of 
unconditional love, biologic selections may prove to be damaging to 
this central bond in life. This is a nebulous and hypothetical concern 
but sufficiently ominous to sustain a policy against broad-based pre-
natal diagnosis for non-health traits and mild conditions. 
 Finally, the impact of extensive prenatal diagnosis on those with 
disabilities must be considered. At the present time it is probably fair 
to say that social supports for those with disabilities have increased 
in recent decades despite the development of prenatal diagnostic 
technologies. This only means that there is no simple relationship be-
tween these social spheres. If prenatal diagnosis becomes a signifi-
cant and important part of pregnancy management, then concerns 
over the impact of this technology on those with disabilities is en-
tirely reasonable. If many prospective parents routinely seek their 
perfect child through extensive selections, then perhaps those par-
ents who choose to forgo this technology will be seen as negligent. If 
social resources are devoted to selecting “the best” children, perhaps 
the disabled children who slip through the net will be the responsibil-
ity of their parents to muddle through as best they can. Or, darker 
still, perhaps withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining care often 
will be deemed appropriate for “defective” children who slip through 
the prenatal screen. Some will argue that any of these may come to 
pass in decades hence as long as we tolerate prenatal diagnosis at all. 
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But surely the risks are greater if we foster the extensive and de-
tailed selection of children. 
 Each of these considerations deserves more attention than I can 
devote here. Nevertheless, we can return to the cases at the begin-
ning and see how this discussion might guide us to a decision. In 
Case #1, Dr. Owen failed to provide Molly and Bert information 
about the increased risk of Down syndrome by virtue of Molly’s age. 
A child with Down syndrome was born. Do they have a legal and 
ethical claim against Dr. Owen, who chose not to inform them of the 
risk? In most jurisdictions a legal claim would have a strong founda-
tion and, under my analysis, a strong claim for ethical criticism as 
well. This has become a familiar enough situation that relatively 
clear answers are available. 
 Case #2 is more problematic. The physician failed to take a full 
family history and a child was born with an increased risk of breast 
and ovarian cancer as an adult. To date, there is no clear standard 
that encourages obstetricians to take a family history of cancer since 
cancer is not immediately relevant to the health of the mother or fe-
tus. No cases have been brought as of yet to explicitly raise this is-
sue. Further, there is a general consensus that BRCA1/BRCA2 test-
ing should not be offered in the context of prenatal diagnosis, nor are 
children generally offered genetic testing for adult onset conditions 
unless preventive measures are appropriate in childhood. The analy-
sis above supports this general consensus. From my perspective, risk 
of an adult onset disease in a child does not cause a sufficient impact 
on the parents to warrant prenatal diagnosis as a standard of care.  
 Case #3 was developed as a situation in which prenatal diagnosis 
for a “trivial” and non-health related condition (perfect musical pitch) 
might seem plausible. Further, the error of the physician was provid-
ing false information, not the potentially more excusable error of 
omission in failing to inform about testing capabilities. There are no 
legal cases to address such a claim, nor can we expect one in the fore-
seeable future. From an ethical perspective, this analysis provides no 
support for the parent’s claim of injury. The notion that a healthy 
child embodies a harm to the family because he lacks an extraordi-
nary talent is not sustainable. While perhaps we understand the 
parent’s sentiments in this situation, the use of this powerful tech-
nology for such a selection is contrary to a set of values that we must 
seek to protect. Prenatal diagnosis has appropriate uses, but our so-
ciety must carefully articulate those uses before we lose too much in 
the name of progress. 
 
 
